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Experimenting on Human Subjects:
Philosophical Perspectives*
Ruth Macklint
and
Susan Sherwint
The ethical problems that attend the use of human subjects
present difficult questions both for researchers and for 'ociety. The
authors investigate these issues from various philosophical points of
view, focusing on the theories of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart
Mill. After exploring the shortcomings of these theories as guides
for resolving the ethical questions inherent in human experimenta-
tion, the authors suggest John Rawls' theory of social justice as a
model for making ethical judgments.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE USE OF human beings in scientific research raises funda-
mental issues -that lie at the heart of philosophical inquiry.
The first question that arises concerning experimentation on human
subjects is: Why are we disturbed at all by such experimentation?
Put more precisely, why do questions arise about experimentation
on human beings when there are no similar questions concerning
experimentation on inanimate objects? This general question is
the basis for the more specific questions to which the analysis in
this paper will be addressed.
There is, of course, an obvious and, indeed, trivial answer to
the broader question: Human beings are persons, and persons
should be treated differently from things, or inanimate objects. This
obvious answer is one that we all accept and that we presuppose in
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our worries about experimenting on human subjects. However, the
deeper, philosophical answer to the basic question constitutes an ex-
plication and justification of the claim asserted in the trivial response.
We want to know the nature of persons, the centrally important char-
acteristics' of human beings, which make them different from inani-
mate objects in a way that is relevant to how human beings ought
to be treated. The answer to this question requires that we explore
some territory that lies at the intersection of the two following philo-
sophical areas: philosophy of mind and ethics.
Before turning to a brief look at the cluster of general ques-
tions in philosophy of mind and ethics which relate to the nature of
persons and how human beings ought to be treated, it would be well
to identify the two specific questions on which this paper will fo-
cus: (1) What kinds of experiments on human beings can be
morally justified? and (2) Under what constraints should experi-
mental subjects be selected or allowed to participate? In a philo-
sophical examination of these questions, it is necessary to note sev-
eral specific concepts that are prominent in the area in which ethics
and philosophy of mind intersect and that bear crucially on the sorts
of values we must identify and explore. These concepts include
the presumed rationality and autonomy of persons as well as the
notions of voluntariness, coercion, and paternalism. All of the con-
cepts bear. on the central moral values in our view of human beings:
that since persons have an intrinsic worth and an inherent dignity,
they ought to be treated with respect. Not surprisingly, these concepts
and values cluster around the debates and dilemmas relating to "in-
formed consent," a preeminent concern in human experimentation. 2
The discussion in this paper will focus on the specific application
of these concepts to the problems surrounding human experimenta-
tion and look briefly at some of the philosophical underpinnings.
1. Sometimes what we refer to here as "centrally important characteris-
tics" are termed "essential properties" or the "essence" of human beings. In
such accounts, notably those of Plato and Aristotle, all things-including per-
sons-are assumed to have an essence, or that which makes them the kind of
thing they are. Many modem accounts, especially those of existentialist phil-
osophers, deny that man has an essence. We want to be neutral concerning
these essentialist or antiessentialist metaphysical positions, and so we hope that
our terminology is acceptable to anyone who has any views whatever on this
subject. All we intend in referring to "centrally important characteristics" is
that set of attributes or properties, possessed by humans, which leads to our
having moral rules, ethical beliefs, systems of reward and punishment, or any-
thing else presupposing human responsibility for human actions.
2. See Cowan, Human Experimentation: The Review Process in Prac-
tice, 25 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 533, 536-37 (1974).
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II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
Among other things, philosophy of mind is an inquiry into the
nature of persons. What, if anything, is unique or special about
persons? How do their characteristics, abilities, structure, and func-
tion differ from those of other entities that we categorize as things,
machines, or instruments? Unless we can begin to formulate an
answer to this type of question, we cannot move to the basic ethical
questions which this paper addresses. In attempting to spell out
the answer to the inquiry in philosophy of mind, we will construct a
framework for an ethical theory that offers moral principles for how
we ought to treat people or what sorts of actions are morally per-
missible. It is not sufficient for an ethical theory merely to assert
such principles, but it also must offer a justification for them.
Moral philosophy is not casuistry, a study of cases of conscience in
an attempt to give specific solutions to problematic ethical dilem-
mas. Instead, philosophical ethics seeks to offer general moral prin-
ciples and a thorough justification for their adoption and applica-
tion in a wide variety of situations in which any person might find
himself. This presupposes at least a provisional account of the na-
ture of persons.
A further word about moral philosophy is in order. Unlike spe-
cific ethical codes of behavior or even ethical prescriptions or com-
mandments that derive from religious sources, philosophical ethical
theories generally avoid dogmatic principles or rigid, exceptionless
commands. One purpose of a sound philosophical ethics is to me-
diate between an unjustified dogmatism, on the one hand, and an
unwarranted moral skepticism on the other. Hence, philosophi-
cal ethics places a premium on the giving of reasons, both in sup-
port of the moral principles themselves and against the competing
claims of dogmatic ethics and moral skepticism. Moreover, as we
shall try to show in the account that follows, the fundamental moral
principles of the most prominent ethical theories can serve as a ba-
sis for addressing the specific issues that arise in connection with
experimentation on human subjects.
We return now to a closer look at the general question posed
at the outset: What are the centrally important characteristics of
human beings, which render them different from inanimate objects
in a way that is relevant to how human beings ought to be treated?
After laying the groundwork through inquiry into this question-in-
cluding a brief look at two prominent ethical theories-we shall be
prepared to discuss the ethically relevant criteria for answering the
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two specific questions pertinent to human experimentation: (1)
What kinds of experiments can be justified? and (2) Under what
constraints should subjects be selected or allowed to participate?
The first human characteristic relevant to our concerns here is
that of sentience. -Human beings, like other higher forms of animal
life, are sentient creatures; that is, they are capable of feeling pleas-
ure and pain under a wide range of predictable circumstances. What
is more, people pursue pleasure and seek to avoid pain. Some
philosophers and psychologists have gone so far as to claim that
pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the sole factors moti-
vating human behavior.3 We need not go this far, however, in
order to acknowledge the primacy of pain and pleasure as deter-
minants of human action. It is this basic fact of sentience, con-
joined with the teleological principle that people seek pleasurable
ends and avoid actions with painful or unpleasant consequences,
that has led to the widespread acceptance of one prominent ethical
theory, utilitarianism.
One of the leading utilitarians, the 19th century English philoso-
pher, John Stuart Mill, argued that pleasure is the sole thing that
is good as an end. Since each person takes his own pleasure or
happiness to be his ultimate aim or goal, toward which all particular
activities are a means, Mill claimed -that the value that should be
maximized in the community as a whole is the greatest happiness
of all. For the most part, Mil followed his utilitarian predeces-
sor, Jeremy Bentham, in adopting the "Greatest Happiness
Principle" as the fundamental moral principle of his ethical theory.
4
3. Such a view may be found in the words of Jeremy Bentham:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sover-
eign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On
the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (2d ed. P. Taylor 1972).
Freud expressed a similar view:
The sovereign tendency obeyed by these primary processes is easy of
recognition; it is called the pleasure-pain (Lust-Unlust) principle, or
more shortly the pleasure-principle. These processes strive towards
gaining pleasure; from any operation which might arouse unpleasant-
ness ("pain") mental activity draws back (repression).
S. F aEu, Formulation Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning,
in GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 22 (reissued 1963).
4. Mill writes, "the principle of utility, or, as Bentham latterly called it,
the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral
doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority." J.S. MILL,
UrmrrRuLsusM 6 (Bobbs-Merrill 1957).
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As Mill himself stated, under the principle of utility, "actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure." 5 In order to prevent any misun-
derstanding of this influential theory, a bit more needs to be said by
way of explication and interpretation of the utilitarian moral princi-
ple.
First, it should be emphasized that Mill explicitly disavows the
interpretation of his theory as a "gross form" of hedonism.0 While
he clearly identifies happiness and pleasure, as shown in the above-
quoted statement of the utilitarian principle, Mill nevertheless ar-
gues for a qualitative distinction among pleasures in addition to the
usual distinction in terms of quantity or amount-the view held by
Bentham and others. Mill writes:
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recog-
nize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable
and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that,
while in estimating all other things quality is considered as
well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be sup-
posed to depend on quantity alone.7
Thus, although Mill does identify happiness and pleasure, he ar-
gues against the mistake of confounding "the two very different
ideas of happiness and content."'8  These so-called "higher pleas-
ures" include the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imag-
ination, and of the moral sentiments-all of which are to be ac-
corded a higher value as pleasures than those of "mere sensation."
A second, related point should also be stressed in explicating
Mill's view. Utilitarianism might be criticized as being a crass, ma-
jority-rule doctrine, in which a preference for any action or state
of affairs whatsoever of 51 percent of the population renders that
action or state of affairs morally acceptable. This criticism rests
on a misinterpretation of the intent of the utilitarian moral position.
Throughout his essay, and especially in the lengthy final chapter en-
titled "On the Connection Between Justice and Utility," Mill ex-
presses concern for minority rights and, indeed, the basic rights of
persons. The claimed weakness of the utilitarian position lies in
Mill's response to an objector who asks why society ought to defend
5. Id. at 10.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 13.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
a person in the possession of his rights; Mill replies: "I can give
him no other reason than general utility."9  Although nonutilitari-
ans such as Immanuel Kant and John Rawls"0 have found Mill's an-
swer unsatisfactory, a careful reading of Mill's writings reveals a per-
vasive humane and humanitarian thread woven throughout. A seri-
ous problem remains, however, in that the principle of utility alone
-as a fundamental moral principle--does not seem able to account
for a variety of ethical duties and precepts of justice without the
additional corollaries and interpretive remarks offered by Mill and
other defenders of utilitarianism.
In summary, we should emphasize again that utilitarians
claim that their ethical theory is derivable from certain indisputable
facts about human beings-sentience and the tendency of persons to
seek pleasure or happiness and avoid pain or unhappiness. It is
clear that the utilitarian principle often provides the basis for how
people actually make judgments about the rightness and wrongness
of actions. As we shall see below, this ethical principle is fre-
quently the operative criterion that guides many decisions in specific
cases of experimentation on humans. In particular, it seems that
utility is the underlying moral principle in the notion of the "risk-
benefit" equation, about which more will be said later.1
We now turn to the second basic characteristic of human be-
ings, with which another prominent ethical theory is closely associ-
ated. This attribute of the human species is rationality, and one
major ethical theory that arises largely out of this human character-
istic is the doctrine of the 18th century German philosopher, Im-
manuel Kant. Closely linked with the concept of rationality is
that of personal autonomy, to which ethical values are attached.
Kant's ethical system begins by presupposing rationality and auto-
nomy as fundamental characteristics of persons. He then constructs
a moral theory that is applicable to all rational beings, who possess
what he describes as an autonomous, self-legislating will. The in-
herent autonomy of each person, which is produced by his rational-
ity, requires that each person be treated as a creature having dignity
and, therefore, worthy of respect. In Kant's view, rationality and
autonomy are the essential humanity-conferring properties and give
rise to the moral principle that persons should be accorded dignity
and treated with respect.
9. Id. at 66.
10. See Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
PROBLEMS OF MoRAL PmLosopHy 236-37 (2d ed. P. Taylor 1972); J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTicE 209-11 (1971).
11. Text accompanying note 37 infra.
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Kant used the term rationality to apply to an attribute of the
human species rather than to an attribute of individual persons. As
a result, the Kantian framework does not give us a criterion for dis-
tinguishing between rational individuals and irrational or nonrational
individuals. Instead, it treats the human species (or any other
"higher" beings) as having the capacity to reason and form con-
cepts and, hence, as possessing the attribute of rationality. Some
further distinctions and an explication of several specifiable senses of
rational will be offered in section III, below. We hope to show that
each of these different senses of rational is a key concept in prob-
lems relating to informed consent in special groups of experimen-
tal subjects: young children and the aged, the mentally retarded,
the so-called "mentally ill," and prisoners. What is required at this
point is a brief account of the way in which the concept of rational-
ity and that of autonomy are linked in Kant's theory. We may
then see how the human characteristic of rationality gives rise to
some fundamental ethical values and moral principles.
Kant's notion of morality is that "its law must be valid, not merely
for men, but for all rational creatures generally, not merely under
certain contingent conditions or with exceptions, but with absolute
necessity . *... ,12 This passage makes explicit Kant's concept of
morality as one that is applicable to all rational beings rather than
one whose application is designed specifically for humans; it also ex-
hibits the tone of his moral philosophy, which has led many to object
that it is an implausibly rigid ethical system, since its law com-
mands "with absolute necessity." On the basis of this notion of the
nature and scope of morality, Kant formulates his account of the
derivation of the commands of ethics:
[Slince moral laws ought to hold good for every rational
creature, we must derive them from the general concept of
a rational being ...
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational
beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the
conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e. have
a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles re-
quires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason.,,
Kant terms the fundamental moral principle or law of morality
"the categorical imperative,"1' 4 since the moral law commands ab-
12. Id. at 222.
13. Id. at 223-24.
14. Id. at 228.
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solutely (categorically) rather than conditionally (hypothetically).
In the archaic language in which Kant himself expresses it, the
categorical imperative states: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou
canst at the same lime will that it should become a universal law."'
5
Kant argues that all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this
one fundamental principle, since persons can always formulate a
maxim for each act they consider performing and then test the
maxim for conformity to the fundamental principle, or categorical
imperative. If the maxim passes the test, that is, if it can consistently
be willed by the agent as a universal law, applicable to all rational
creatures, then the contemplated action is morally permissible or
morally right. We should emphasize here that this is a purely for-
mal requirement for Kant, a necessary condition for an imperative
to count as a moral law. The test Kant postulates is generally re-
ferred to, in an alternative formulation, as the requirement of gen-
eralization, or universalizability, in ethics. The core idea in all
these views is that a moral law is one that holds for all persons simi-
lar in relevant respects in all like circumstances. Thus, what is
right for one would be right for all similar persons in similar circum-
stances. Moreover, for a maxim to pass the test of the categorical
imperative, it is not a matter of whether or not the agent can will
the maxim to be a universal law as a matter of psychological fact.
It is, rather, a question of logical consistency: maxims that cannot
be willed to be universal laws, as prescribed by the categorical im-
perative, fail either because they lead to a logical contradiction or
because such a will would contradict itself. A good will formulates
and acts only on those maxims that prescribe our duties; morally
right acts are those done for the sake of duty. So, for example,
if a person contemplated breaking a ptomise when it was inconveni-
ent for him to keep it, he would have to formulate a maxim of the
following form: it is morally permissible to break promises when it
is inconvenient to keep them. This maxim cannot (consistently) be
universalized, since if everyone acted in accordance with it, the social
institution of promising would soon break down, and there would
no longer be a meaningful concept of a promise.
There is but one categorical imperative according to Kant, and
yet he offers what he terms a second formulation of this fundamen-
tal principle: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never
15. Id. at 229.
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as means only."' 6 It is not our concern here to debate the question
whether or not this statement is another formulation of the same
,principle or a new principle -based on additional assumptions; we
leave that debate to. Kantian scholars. The second formulation
succeeds in capturing a common moral sentiment: we ought to
treat our fellow human beings as ends in themselves and not as
mere means or instruments for our own purposes, even to serve so-
called "noble" aims. It is this second formulation of Kant's cate-
.gorical imperativethat seems especially appropriate as a moral prin-
ciple applicable in cases of human experimentation, for we can al-
ways test proposed actions using human subjects against the princi-
ple that persons should be treated as ends, never as mere means.
Kant claims that "[the foundation of this principle is: rational
nature exists as an end in itself."17
Finally, Kant offers what he considers the third formulation of
the categorical imperative, from which the notion of autonomy
emerges. The "third practical principle of the will, which is the ul-
timate condition of its harmony with the universal practical reason
[is] the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally leg-
islative will."' 8  This capacity of every human will to be a univer-
sally legislating will is what constitutes the principle of autonomy of
the will, which, according to Kant, is claimed to be "the basis of the
dignity of human and of every rational nature."'19 We can see,
then, how the fundamental characteristic of rationality and the deriv-
ative concept of autonomy form the foundation for those values most
central to our humane moral beliefs. From Kant's moral philoso-
phy we obtain the important value conception of the intrinsic worth
or dignity of human beings. In arguing for the central importance of
duty in a conception of morality, Kant sums up these interrelation-
ships as follows:
The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e. duty,
does not rest at all on feelings, -impulses, or inclinations,
but solely on the relation of rational beings to one another,
a relation in which the will of a rational being must always
be regarded as legislative, since it otherwise could not be
conceived as an end in itself. Reason then refers every
maxim of the will, regarding it as legislating universally, to
every other will and also ito every action towards oneself;
and this not on account of' any other practical motive or
16. Id. at 234-35.
17. Id. at 234.
18. Id. at 236.
19. Id. at 239.
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any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a
rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself
also gives.20
The ethical theories of Kant and Mill each propose a basic gen-
eral principle, according to which any moral agent can test his con-
templated actions to ascertain their moral rightness or wrongness.
In Kant's system, the central moral notion is that of duty, and the
intrinsic human values are autonomy and dignity, both derived
from the essential human attribute of rationality. Mill bases his
theory on the empirically ascertained attribute of sentience in per-
sons along with the observable goal-directed behavior of human be-
ings in their pursuit of pleasure or happiness and avoidance of pain
and suffering. The basic conceptions of morality found in both Kant
and Mill seem to be required for a full account of our common moral
sentiments and beliefs. .In addition, they both provide a general
principle under which we can subsume particular actions or subordi-
nate moral rules in order to test their moral acceptability or validity.
One need not consider himself a hedonist in order to accept the utili-
tarian principle, nor need one adhere, in general, -to a duty-oriented
conception of ethics in order to acknowledge the importance of the
categorical imperative (in any of the formulations Kant suggests).
II. ETHICAL CONCEPTS
Having laid the groundwork through a brief examination of two
major normative theories in philosophical ethics, we turn next to an
exploration of several subordinate concepts in ethics---concepts that
relate directly to the moral problems surrounding human experimen-
tation. Arising out of the facts of man's sentience and pursuit of
his own happiness or welfare, and also out of the fundamental hu-
man attribute of rationality and the derived notions of autonomy
and dignity, the subordinate ethical concepts relevant to experiment-
ing on humans include coercion and paternalism, autonomy and
dependency.
The concepts we are about to examine all converge on the cen-
tral concern in human experimentation: the need to obtain the in-
formed consent of the experimental subject. It is evident that
only by obtaining informed consent can we be sure we are treating
the experimental subject as an end, and not as mere means; neglect-
ing to seek informed consent would indicate a deeper failure to rec-
ognize the autonomy and, hence, the humanity of the subject. All
20. Id. at 238.
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three formulations of Kant's categorical imperative are relevant
to our understanding of why we deem informed consent an import-
ant prerequisite for any experimentation on human beings.
It is appropriate, however, to begin our inquiry with a further
look at the concept of rationality, since that notion lies at the roots
of Kant's ethical system and is also the recurrent issue in problems
relating to special groups of experimental subjects (e.g., children,
the retarded, the mentally ill). The concept of rationality is prob-
lematic, partly because it is not a purely descriptive concept but is
itself a normative notion, and, more importantly, because the term
rational has several related yet distinct senses. 'Perhaps the most
fundamental sense is that in which the concept of rationality pur-
ports to distinguish one class of beings or entities from all other enti-
ties or creatures. In this way, man is defined as "the rational ani-
mal," and so rationality is seen as a distinctive or essential property
of the human species. It is this sense of rationality that appears to
be Kant's conception, providing the basis for his ethical system. It is
not clear, however, whether this sense of the term applies only to
the human species (and, if they exist, "higher" beings such as God
and angels), although it is intended to apply to all persons, qua
members of the human species. The scope of this sense of rational
remains open, with conceptual arguments offered on behalf of con-
sidering highly advanced computers, robots of the future, and, per-
haps, dolphins as rational entities. It is worth speculating about
whether we would become gravely concerned about experiment-
ing on dolphins (in a way different from our ordinary concerns about
animals) if, as a result of empirical inquiry, conceptual decision, or
both, we determined that dolphins were rational creatures. It ap-
pears that both the attributes of sentience and rationality are re-
quired to generate what we consider moral concern for existing en-
tities, in the sense that requires our treating them with dignity and
respect. Computers and present-day robots lack the property of sen-
tience, so even if we were to ascribe rationality to them, this alone
would not require that we treat them in accordance with moral
principles (although we may nonetheless decide that they should be
kept in good repair). There is an asymmetry, then, between the
possession of rationality alone and the possession of sentience alone,
in respect to our treatment of non-human entities. The posses-
sion of sentience alone is a criterion for our treating creatures with
some moral concern, as shown by our behavior towards higher forms
of animal life and by the laws and regulations governing the use of
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animals in experimental contexts.21 We propose to bypass a discus-
sion of experimenting on animals here, noting simply that sentience
alone introduces the propriety of moral attitudes and behavior. It
remains an open question whether the existence of rationality alone
would similarly entitle its possessor to moral treatment at the hands
of human beings.
The sense of rationality as necessarily applying to all human
creatures is not a helpful notion when we want to distinguish among
human beings in respect of their rationality, for special purposes.
These purposes may include a perceived need to interfere with the
behavior of those persons who are deemed irrational, whether on
their own behalf (i.e., paternalistically), or for the good of society
(i.e., coercively). Whether persons lacking in rationality in a qual-
itative sense, may be treated in ways that are morally impermissible
when performed on fully rational humans is a central question aris-
ing in the context of experimentation on human subjects. The so-
called mentally ill, the retarded, young children, the senile aged-all
these persons have been considered, at the very least, as lacking
full-scale rationality, if not as wholly irrational.
We turn next to two related yet distinct senses of rational, which
appear to constitute the usual criteria for distinguishing persons
generally considered rational from those deemed irrational or non-
rational. In one of its common meanings, the term rational denotes
the capacity of humans to use their reason (rationality) to maximize
their chosen or accepted ends. This is the sense in which a rational
person can defer the temptation of short range gain or pleasure for
the sake of a longer term goal that he holds to be more important.
Such a sense of rationality also encompasses the conception of a
rational person as one who is good at calculation and inductive as
well as deductive reasoning, since these are necessary attributes for
consistently being able to choose the best means to one's ends.
The other closely related sense of rational refers to the chosen ends
themselves. In this sense of the term, the chosen means, if any, are
not a criterion for ascribing rationality to the agent; it is, rather, the
ends themselves that confer rationality. Self-destructive ends, pain-
ful or unprofitable goals, apparently pointless acts-all these are
characteristic of the irrational, as the correlative notion. Thus, per-
sons who attempt suicide are considered irrational by psychiatrists
and others, and, as a result, are subjected to coercive measures
21. E.g., Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-55 (1970);
9 C.F.1. §§ 3.1-.114 (1973).
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such as involuntary hospitalization. It is evident that the foregoing
senses of the term irrational are different, since a person may be
rational in one of these senses and irrational according to the
other.22 Nevertheless, these two senses of rational and irrational en-
ter prominently into ethical considerations in experimenting on hu-
mans.
One major concern in human experimentation is the question
of the competence of persons to give their consent. The relevant
meaning of competence here encompasses both of the senses of ra-
tional discussed immediately above. While it is patently clear that
infants, the severely retarded, and wholly uncommunicative emo-
tionally disturbed persons are not competent to give consent in any
of the requisite senses of rational, the concepts in question fall along
a continuum and may be difficult to apply in borderline cases.23 In
approaching such problems, we should view the senses of rational
and irrational either as enduring attributes of the persons to whom
they apply or else as temporary attributes that cut across a wide
range of abilities or capacities of a person. It is evident that infants,
the severely retarded, or the emotionally disturbed lack the func-
tional capacity, in general, for making intelligent decisions or rational
choices, engaging in careful deliberations, or adopting prudent long-
range ends or goals. Whether the class of persons lacks full-scale
rationality or competence as an enduring attribute (e.g., the men-
tally retarded), or whether the irrational or non-rational status is
temporary but pervades the whole personality (e.g., infants and
"curable" mental patients), the above-noted concepts of rationality
cut across most or all of a person's cognitive and deliberative abili-
ties and capacities. There is, however, another use of the term ir-
rational in which it applies only to a temporary and localized attri-
bute of persons. Two sorts of examples serve to illustrate this use.
First, there are cases in which a person might have temporary mood
disturbances (e.g., depression) during which time he is not fully
rational and may even contemplate suicide; most of the time, how-
ever, he can function adequately and well, even as a highly compe-
22. An example might be the person who "successfully" commits suicide--
with efficiency and with the least financial and emotional cost to others.
23. It is generally held that lack of competence or rationality in a person
warrants interference with his autonomy by others, in the belief that such in-
terference is justified if it is necessary to the person's health or welfare. This
sort of interference is central to the meaning of the concept of paternalism-
a concept that plays a key role in human experimentation when the experimen-
tal subjects themselves are unable to give informed consent.
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tent professional or academic. Secondly, there are cases in which a
person might be suffering from temporary shock (e.g., after an acci-
dent) or profound grief (e.g., following the death of a loved one)
or even extreme fear and anxiety (e.g., prior to difficult surgery on
oneself or one's child). In both categories the competence
of such persons may be called into question, even if the lack
of rationality exhibited is temporary or confined to a small area of
their total activities. Such an application of the notion of rationality
enters prominently into judgments concerning informed consent:
Under what circumstances can consent be considered fully in-
formed, and who besides the experimental subject himself ought to
be allowed to grant consent?
A word should be said about some of the epistemological issues
pertaining to informed consent. While our primary focus in this ar-
ticle is on the ethical issues in experimentation on human subjects,
philosophical problems of knowledge are relevant as well. The
chief epistemological concern arises because the notion of "being
informed" is none too clear. It is obvious that there are vastly dif-
ferent amounts of information that a person may possess, and, as a
result, varying degrees of one's being informed. The question in the
present connection is, how much information, and what specific sorts
of information, ought a person have before his consent can properly
be said to be informed?24  Some persons-usually, but not always,
physicians2 5-claim that a patient, or lay persons in general, can
never be fully informed. In order for them to be, the argument
runs, they would have to know as much as the physician knows
about diseases, risks, complications, statistics about similar cases,
and perhaps a range of other facts. If people had to know all these
facts, theories, and statistics in order to be truly informed, consent
could rarely be given even for most therapeutic procedures, much
less for a variety of experiments employing human subjects.26 So,
it is reasonable to look for some standard other than "full and com-
24. See Cowan, supra note 2, at 552-53, for a listing of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's criteria for informed consent.
25. E.g., Letter to the Editor from Nicholas J. Demy, M.D., 217 J.A.M.A.
696-97 (1971); Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw
ENO. J. MED. 465-66 (1972).
26. As Dr. Cowan notes, much the same problem exists on institutional
review committees as a result of the medical ignorance of nonphysician mem-
bers. See Cowan, supra note 2, at 558. Ironically, it would seem that the non-
physician reviewers ignorance might be the very factor that would best qualify
him to appreciate just how informed the consent given by an equally ignorant
subject is.
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plete information" on which to base consent. Just what such a
standard should be remains a problem to be solved, but it is not in-
surmountable. Focus should probably be in the area of ascertain-
ing what information is relevant for an experimental subject's con-
sent to be sufficiently informed. While judgments about relevance
are also subject to dispute, at least the problem becomes more
manageable. An additional epistemological issue is the difficulty
that the physician or experimenter faces in determining whether the
experimental subject has the requisite understanding of the relevant
information to grant his informed consent.27  Evidence is some-
times brought forth to show that even when patients or experimen-
tal subjects are given the necessary information, for a variety of
possible reasons they may not adequately process or comprehend
that information. So even when experimental subjects have been
properly informed (told) by others about a proposed experiment,
the subjects may nonetheless remain uninformed (lacking in under-
standing) in important ways.
Aside from -these epistemological issues concerning what it is to
be informed and how we can tell when a person really is informed
in a particular case, there are the primary ethical difficulties relat-
ing to autonomy and dependency, paternalism and coercion. An
analysis of the manner in which consent is obtained reveals how
such ethical questions arise. Such an analysis requires an explica-
tion of the notion of voluntariness, in the sense that means "unco.-
erced actions."'28  In addition to being informed, consent must also
be voluntary, or uncoerced, in order not to violate our moral princi-
ples prohibiting interference with other autonomous persons. It is
precisely at this point that most of the moral problems are found
concerning the use of prisoners as experimental subjects, and some
of these same issues arise with other institutionalized populations,
27. This difficulty has prompted some institutional review committees to
require that a family member witness the giving of consent in order to further
insure that the subject actually understood the full impact of his consent. Id.
at 553-54.
28. There are other related meanings of the term "voluntary" besides the
sense rendered here as "uncoerced." Especially in legal contexts, the notion
of voluntariness may have a somewhat different application than the sense ex-
plicated in this article. Voluntariness is a somewhat problematic concept, and
we do not intend to stipulate a definition; nor do we imply that the sense of
the term that means "uncoerced" is the only or even the primary sense. Ra-
ther, we hope to capture the meaning that is central to the notion of a genuine
volunteer: one who (voluntarily) offers himself for some purpose without be-
ing coerced.
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such as the aged or the terminally M11.29 Consent for research, there-
fore, must be voluntary and granted by mentally competent, rational
agents who are properly informed.
For present purposes, we may identify several special classes
of "dependent persons." These categories include children,8 0 men-
tally retarded persons, the aged, prisoners, and the mentally ill-
especially those emotionally disturbed persons who are institution-
alized. The individuals comprising these classes of persons are func-
tionally incapacitated or undeveloped in some way, and, therefore,
tend to be viewed as less capable of autonomous actions and de-
cisions than are normal adults. While some of these individuals
are dependent because of less-than-normal capacity to think or rea-
son or make judgments (e.g., young children and mentally retarded
persons), others, such as prisoners, are rendered dependent in spe-
cial ways by he actions of society. The constraints placed on insti-
tutionalized persons constitute limitations on their freedom in ways
that raise serious questions about their ability to grant fully volun-
tary consent to serve as experimental subjects. The ethical prob-
lems come to focus on the element of coercion that seems to be
present on many occasions when informed consent is sought.
How can we tell when voluntariness is present? There are
paradigm cases of coerced actions-those that are performed un-
der threat of violence or some other negative sanction. If I am ac-
costed by someone with a gun who demands, "Your money or your
life!" and I hand over my purse, do I do so voluntarily? In one
sense, I do it voluntarily since I choose this alternative rather than
the other, less desirable one. So, I voluntarily hand over my purse
rather than risk death at the hands of the gunman. In another
sense, this action does not seem wholly voluntary when compared
with other cases in which I act not under threat of violence but
willingly or "out of my own volition" or "of my own free will," as it
is commonly put. In one perfectly ordinary way of speaking, I
29. An example of ethically suspect research on old persons who were hos-
pitalized and terminally ill is the cancer study performed at the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, New York. In this experiment, cancer
cells were implanted in these patients, and it was charged that some of the
experiments in this study were performed without the informed consent of the
participants. For a full discussion, see EXPERuMENTATION wrru HUMAN BEINGS
9-66 (J. Katz ed. 1972).
30. For a discussion of some special problems associated with experimen-
tation on children in connection with the development and testing of drugs,
see Cowan, supra note 2, at 556-57.
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hand over my purse to the gunman "against my will." There is,
it appears, a problematic conceptual issue that needs to be ad-
dressed if we are to be able to assess when a person's decisions
and actions are truly voluntary, in the sense of not coerced. We
still have a problem of deciding what criteria to employ in judging
when informed consent is truly voluntary and when a competent
adult experimental subject is performing actions or making decisions
under some form of coercion, however subtle. Critics of the use of
prisoners (as well as other institutionalized persons) in research
contend that the very role of prisoner precludes fully voluntary de-
cision and action on the part of such individuals. 31 This contention
maintains that an element of coercion always exists in the very na-
ture of the prisoner's role and in the constraints inherent in an in-
stitutionalized setting. We should be aware that debate on these is-
sues rests only partly on moral considerations; much of the disagree-
ment often lies in conceptual and factual matters, as well. For ex-
ample, if the parties to a dispute about the morality of using pris-
oners in research could agree on whether prisoners can, in principle,
ever volunteer in an uncoerced manner, or whether, on the contrary,
their being prisoners entails an element of coercion in all beha-
vior that involves prison officials and outsiders, they would come
closer to settling the moral dilemma that lies at the heart of this
issue.
Unlike prisoners, who are rendered dependent by the actions
of society, other types of persons suffer reduced autonomy because
of a natural dependence. The aged may suffer from impaired men-
tal capacity, like retarded persons, and young children are not yet
capable of autonomous decision and action. It is natural, and perhaps
even necessary in many cases, to assume a protective attitude to-
ward persons who are functionally incapacitated in some way. This
attitude is exhibited, for example, in the phenomenon of "maternal
instinct" in humans and other mammals. Dependent status makes
the elderly and the retarded especially vulnerable to a variety of
experimental treatments, only some of which might benefit them.32
31. See Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDA-
LUS 449-55 (1969); Mitford, Experiments Behind Bars, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan. 1973, at 64, 73.
32. In the cancer study cited in note 29 supra, the researchers made no
claims about possible benefits to the experimental subjects themselves. In con-
trast, the researchers who deliberately exposed retarded children at the Willow-
brook State School to viral hepatitis defended their research on the grounds
that these children would have contracted hepatitis even without this artificial
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When research is viewed as possibly or probably beneficial to the
experimental subjects, it is justified on paternalistic grounds, namely:
Interference is warranted because it will promote the welfare of the
subjects themselves. Where no perceived benefit is possible or
likely for the subjects themselves, an attempt to justify the interfer-
ence cannot be based on paternalistic grounds. Rather, the experi-
menter must seek some other justification for treating persons as
having less than full autonomy, that is, treating them in a coercive
manner. People in institutions of any sort might be viewed as
ideal subjects for experimentation because of the ease of observing
them, the ability of researchers to select control groups, the oppor-
tunity for repetitive or long-term research using the same subjects,
and so on. Unfortunately, however, these same institutionalized
persons are often ideal subjects for another reason: their depend-
ency and diminished human capacities render them easy prey to co-
ercive measures of all sorts, including use in medical experiments
by well-intentioned as well as unscrupulous researchers.
All of the moral issues in this broad area might be phrased
in terms of the ethical notion of the rights of persons: What are
the rights of children, retarded persons, and the mentally ill? In
general, how ought persons who are functionally incapacitated be
viewed with respect to the presence or absence of their human
rights? What sorts of attributes must a person have-or lack-in
order to retain basic human rights such as the right not to be inter-
fered with or the right to be granted full-fledged freedom and auton-
omy? Who, if anyone, has the right to grant consent for experi-
mentation on minor children, retarded persons, or the mentally ill?
Conceiving the moral issues in terms of rights and duties is, how-
ever, only one way of placing them in an ethical perspective. Ques-
tions of the sort under discussion here do not seem to be made
clearer or easier to answer by formulating them in terms of rights.
Indeed, the ethical waters are often muddied by a variety of claims
about people's rights that are difficult to substantiate. This is
partly because of a range of problems associated with the notion of
rights: Where do they come from? How do we know when they ex-
ist or in whom they reside? How do we settle conflicts of rights or
disagreements about their existence or nonexistence in particular
exposure, but in the experimental setting the children would be "better off"
since they would be under careful observation by the researchers and the hepa-
titis could be kept under control. The Willowbrook research is described by
Saul Krugman and Joan P. Giles in Viral Hepatitis: New Light on an Old
Disease, 212 J.A.M.A. 1019-29 (1970).
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cases? These difficulties are much less pronounced when we are
dealing with legal rights, rather than with moral rights, which are
not embodied in written laws. Moral philosophy addresses itself
to such problems and issues, but has produced no universally ap-
plicable answer in all the years of debate. We believe, therefore,
that knotty moral problems are not simplified by being couched in
terms of people's rights, though it does not follow that talk about
rights or appeals to rights ought to be eliminated entirely from our
moral discourse. Since a good deal of ethical philosophy and many
of our ordinary moral sensibilities and convictions are concerned
with the basic rights of persons, we may still recognize the legiti-
macy of the notion of rights even if that notion is hard to under-
stand fully and difficult to apply.
It is important to provide a clear analysis and explication of
all of the ethical concepts we have discussed in this section, so that
we can develop criteria that are useful and applicable in practice
when informed consent must be obtained. It may be that some pa-
ternalistic acts are justifiable in experimental contexts, while others
are not. We may decide that our fundamental ethical principles
preclude the introduction of any coercive elements into the selec-
tion of experimental subjects or the attempt to gain their consent.
Without careful analysis, we risk making our practical criteria too
weak or too strong, too vague or too ambiguous, and therefore, inap-
propriate or difficult to apply.
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE
Let us turn now to the specific ethical questions arising from
the practice of experimenting on human subjects: (1) What experi-
ments can be morally justified? and (2) Under what constraints
should subjects be selected? In the account that follows, we shall
show how one might obtain reasoned answers to these questions
by using the philosophical theories and conceptual analyses sketched
above.
In answering these questions, it makes a great deal of difference
which ethical theory we choose to adopt. The theories of Kant and
Mill are substantively different, and in some cases they yield dif-
ferent answers to moral questions. We must, therefore, weigh the
options carefully and examine the consequences of adopting either
theory. Once committed to a theory, we should try to be consistent
and avoid appealing to our chosen theory only when its directives
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suit us, while choosing some alternative conception when they do
not.
At first glance, it would seem that the acceptance of Kant's ac-
count requires that we consider all experiments using human sub-
jects as wrong: experimenters necessarily use their subjects as
means, since the subjects are, in a sense, instruments in the experi-
ment. A closer look, however, shows that Kant's imperative is to
treat persons as ends and not as means merely. It is permissible
to treat persons as means, provided that we also consider them as
ends.
Unfortunately, the language of "means" and "ends" is very con-
confusing, and Kant does little to illuminate the matter. It is clear,
though, that he cannot be enjoining us from ever using other persons
to further our own ends. We treat persons as means when we hire
them to move our furniture, cut our hair, treat our illnesses, and
draw up contracts for us. It is a fact of life in any social environ-
ment that we treat people as means; in fact, it is generally believed
that the chief purpose of societies is for people to band together to
meet each other's needs in the most efficient way. 33  Kant's in-
junction, -therefore, cannot be construed as prohibiting any use what-
soever of another person for our own purpose. Rather, it prescribes
that we not treat a person exclusively as a means. We must also
attend to the individual's chosen ends and avoid using the person to
meet our ends, unless by doing so we are contributing to the attain-
ment of his own chosen ends.
With respect to experimentation, Kant would surely approve of
those experiments in which an intended or hoped-for aim is some
benefit to the subjects themselves. If an experiment is conducted
both as a therapeutic attempt and to help others or to further know-
ledge, it is acceptable by this standard. Even if the subjects do not
themselves need this treatment but merely have an interest in the
success of the research for some other reason (for example, if the
research is investigating an illness from which a relative suffers, or
the subjects have a scientific curiosity about the matter, or, simply,
are acting altruistically), the experiment would still be acceptable.
Nonetheless, Kant would find even these experiments unjustifi-
able if they could result in a reduction of an individual's ability to
function as an independent, autonomous, rational agent. Ration-
ality and autonomy are the most important human characteristics,
33. One of the earliest statements of this view appears in PLATO, Tim RE-
PuBLIC, Book II, 367e-372a (F. Cornford transl. Oxford Univ. 1945).
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and, as we noted earlier, they form the basis of our moral frame-
work. Any act that might reduce these capacities would violate an
important standard of human dignity and would be inconsistent
with the third formulation of the categorical imperative. 34 By this
standard, all forms of novel exploratory experimentation on ways of
effecting behavior change in humans would be suspect, be they be-
havior modification techniques, psychosurgery, or new chemical or
electrical stimuli to the brain. The notorious syphilis experiment
done at the Tuskegee Institute, 35 in which unwitting subjects suffer-
ing from syphilis were left untreated for more than thirty years, was
immoral according to Kant's criterion because it was known that
many subjects would become mad in the stage of tertiary syphilis,
and it is morally wrong to bring about or promote irrationality.
Kant also argues that being alive must be a fundamental value
for everyone. Most people naturally choose life over death. For
those who do not, Kant offers arguments to show that everyone who
is able to choose has an obligation not to terminate his own life. It
follows that others must respect this universally binding human end
and that any experiment involving -the death (or even a serious like-
lihood of death) of its subjects is wrong. Hence, even if the subjects
are willing to risk their lives for the sake of the experiment, they
are mistaken, for they ought to value their lives above most other
considerations. It is wrong for anyone to violate this fundamental
end. The only possible exceptions to the presumption against ex-
periments involving death would be those cases in which death is
imminent without the experiment, or where life is otherwise seriously
threatened, say, by a high probability of contracting some fatal dis-
ease; but even then it would be right for subjects only to agree to a
risk of death, while still refusing to allow certain death in the cause
of science.
There is another whole set of experiments that Kant would ob-
ject to: those involving deception. 'His ethical theory requires per-
sons to act only in accordance with maxims that they could consist-
ently will to be universal law. It appears to be clear to Kant that
truth-telling fulfills this criterion while lying does not; thus it is al-
ways wrong to lie. Hence, any experiment that involves deliberate
lying could not be justified in spite of its potential benefits. This is-
34. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Hearings on S. 2071, S. 2072, and HR. 7724 Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 1187-1253 (1973).
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sue is especially pertinent in the social sciences, where a great deal
of research is conducted by means of deceptive experiments. The
most famous of the genre is one run by Stanley Milgram in the mid-
1960's, in which he investigated the degree to which persons will re-
spond to authority.36 The procedure involved telling subjects that
they were to administer painful and even fatal electric shocks to
other volunteers on direction from an experimenter. The supposed
recipient of the shock was actually a stooge, who cried out and
made other appropriate responses on signal, but suffered no ill ef-
fects. Since it was important to the study that the subjects believed
themselves to be actually adminstering shocks, and since 65 percent
of the subjects administered what would have been fatal shocks, it
was obviously ethically preferable to use deception. The only al-
ternative (except not experimenting at all) would have been to
administer killing dosages of shock. Nevertheless, a Kantian would
not approve of this procedure, but would claim that lying in itself
is wrong and cannot be made right by the goodness of its conse-
quences. If the only way that this sort of experiment could have
been conducted without lying would have been by killing people,
then the experiment was unjustifiable in any form and should not
have been conducted.
The utilitarian answer to the question of what experiments are
morally justifiable is much easier to formulate, though surely no
easier to apply. The utilitarian principle requires us to act in the
way that produces the greatest general balance of happiness over un-
happiness. In order to determine whether an experiment is justi-
fied, a utilitarian must calculate the "expected utility," that is, the
good or happiness or welfare likely to come of it. The calculation
proceeds by estimating the amount of happiness and multiplying that
amount by the probability of its coming about as a result of this ex-
periment, thereby obtaining a measure of the benefit at stake. The
utilitarian must then weigh that benefit against the anticipated risk,
determined by multiplying the amount of harm by the probability
of its occurrence. The measure is complex, for it must include
all the possible good and bad effects of the experiment-including
feelings engendered in the general population, feelings of satisfac-
tion or guilt on the part of participants, and consequences of ac-
tions done as a direct result of the experiment. However complex
the utilitarian calculation may be, something very much like it ap-
36. See Milgramn, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 371-78 (1963).
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pears to be the underlying moral principle in the notion of the
risk-benefit equation, as mentioned earlier.37
There is an obvious problem here for both Kantians and utili-
tarians. By the very nature of experimentation, research contexts
often make possible studies for which the results are as yet un-
known. Kant's principle refuses to permit experiments that will re-
sult in decreased autonomy on the part of the subject; Mill's princi-
ple allows only experiments that produce the greatest balance of
good over evil in terms of pleasurable or painful consequences.
The problem that confronts the prospective experimenter, then, lies
in the fact that we cannot accurately predict the results. Inability to
predict results does not, however, grant a license to act in total dis-
regard of consequences (as, for example, in radically innovative ex-
perimental attempts). Instead, this unfortunate feature demands
a strong responsibility on the part of researchers to study as best they
can the possible or likely results and requires them to engage only in
those tests with human subjects in which the experimenters are as-
sured that there is little chance of significant harm to the subjects.
Mistakes might still be made, just as mistakes are made in all
other areas of human activity, but if researchers have sincerely tried
to reduce the likelihood of risk and have not attempted an experi-
ment when they have reason to believe serious harm may result,
then they are justified in performing it.
Utilitarianism permits a wide range of experiments that Kanti-
ans would never consider. For instance, utilitarians would probably
approve an experiment expected to provide a cure for cancer, even
though it was expected to cause its early subjects to develop untreat-
able cancer; Kantians would surely object. Utilitarians as well as
Kantians would object to the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, but on
different grounds: Whereas Kantians would object to the loss of
the subjects' autonomy as a result of illness and possible insanity,
the utilitarians would object because the experiments did little
good. If the experiments had been better designed and were likely
to succeed in producing some significant, useful knowledge leading to
beneficial results ,for humanity, utilitarians might be willing to ap-
prove, despite the resulting illness and insanity generated by the
tests.
Still, utilitarians do not operate with a simple risk-benefit table
that approves any experiment whatsoever where benefit measures
highest. They are obliged to choose the option with the best ratio
37. Text accompanying note 11 supra.
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of benefit to risk, and so they have a strong responsibility to mini-
mize risks. It is important to investigate alternative courses of ac-
tion that might further improve the ratio, even if the benefit already
outweighs the risk. In practice, this requirement would prevent
Mill and most utilitarians from engaging in many experiments that
are threatening to life or that interfere with the basic rights of per-
sons.38  If a great risk is present, utilitarians would generally as-
sume that the experimenter should wait before performing this par-
ticular test and seek a safer means of obtaining the result. However,
if no safe alternative can be devised, and if the expected benefit
clearly outweighs the risk, in terms of happiness or well-being and
pain or suffering, then utilitarians are obliged to permit experiments
that Kantians would unconditionally oppose.
According to either conception of ethics, we can identify some
types of experiments that are morally wrong; even if it were possi-
ble to obtain willing volunteers for such experiments, it would be
wrong to perform them according to the fundamental moral princi-
ples of these theories. However, this analysis does not completely
resolve our ethical questions because there are further moral condi-
tions to be met even within the range of experiments that are not un-
justifiable in principle. In general, these further considerations have
to do with some conception of the individuals involved as experimen-
tal subjects. In the Kantian framework, human beings are thought
to be autonomous creatures having dignity, and, hence, deserving
respect. According to Mill, human beings are happier if they are
treated with dignity and respect and if their personal freedom is
made as extensive as is socially feasible.39 The difference between
these two views in this regard lies in the ultimate end each theory
posits. For Mill, pleasure or happiness is the ultimate end for
man, so all actions must promote that end; for Kant, the only thing
good in itself is a good will-a will whose motive for actions is that
they be done for the sake of duty. In any case, it follows from either
theory that we have a prima facie obligation -to treat other persons
38. Mill claims that the moral agent must assure himself that in benefit-
ing some persons by his actions "he is not violating the rights, that is, the legit-
imate and authorized expectations, of anyone else." J.S. MILL, supra note 4,
at 25.
39. Mill refers to "the love of liberty and personal independence" in man,
and to "a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or
other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher
faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom
it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could be otherwise than mo-
mentarily an object of desire to them." Id. at 13.
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honestly, to seek their consent in matters affecting them, and to be
sensitive to their interests. The most effective way to attain these
goals when dealing with subjects of experimentation is by obtaining
their informed consent for all that we do with them.
,In practice, such obligations are more easily fulfilled with cer-
tain groups of subjects than with others, thus it may be that while an
experiment is permissible if done with one set of subjects, it is im-
permissible if done with some other group of subjects. As we have
stressed, the ideal situation is one in which the experimental subjects
are fully rational persons who have offered genuinely informed, vol-
untary consent. Under such conditions, there is considerable as-
surance that the researchers are not using the subjects solely as
means. We cannot justify using persons as subjects of experiments
against their will. If they actively resist participation, using them
would violate Kant's prescription not to treat persons as mere
means; Mill, too, would consider this an unjustified interference
with the basic rights of persons. Thus, it is wrong to coerce people
into serving as subjects when they have decided otherwise. It fol-
lows, then, that any coercive use of prisoners in experimentation is
wrong.
The need for informed consent is a most difficult requirement,
since it is common for research to deal exclusively with a condi-
tion only experienced by "dependent persons"--those not clearly
capable or clearly incapable of providing informed consent. Medi-
cal researchers cannot investigate all the problems of prenatal in-
jury without experimenting on fetuses, nor can medical or social sci-
entists gain an understanding of the workings of Down's syndrome
(mongolism) without experimenting on some of its victims. Psy-
cho-pharmacologists must surely use psychotic patients to develop
effective antipsychotic drugs, and gerontologists can only understand
senility by conducting research on the senile. Obviously, the list
could be extended to cover every class of persons limited by some
medical or psychological condition.40 The potential benefits are
great; the risks may be small. In so many cases the only hope of
reducing suffering involves using persons who are unable to pro-
vide informed consent. Our problem is to decide when, if ever,
we are justified in conducting an experiment without obtaining in-
formed consent.
40. One class which has posed great difficulty for drug researchers is chil-
dren. Because of the controversy over whether or not a child can give in-
formed consent, "investigators are becoming progressively more reluctant to
test new drugs in children." Cowan, supra note 2, at 557.
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Utilitarians have no serious problem in these cases. There is
a genuine disutility in allowing the practice of treating people as
experimental subjects without their consent. Consider, as an ex-
treme example, the wide-scale discomfort and anxiety experienced
even to this day as a result of experiments performed by the Nazis.
As a mere practical consideration the full cooperation of subjeots,
which can be expected after their consent has been obtained, should
result in the greater success of many experiments. Still, there are
times when we would be scientifically better off without worrying
about informed consent.4 ' In such cases if we instituted some spe-
cial experimental constraints with the aim of reducing anxiety about
the possibility of Nazi-like atrocities, such experiments would be in
accord with the utilitarian principle; hence, it would be justifiable
on that theory to use subjects without their consent. In fact, utili-
tarianism seems to mandate the use of subjects with limited abili-
ties whenever possible. Since such subjects are less likely to benefit
society in other ways than are normal persons, it is in the social in-
terest to take risks with their lives rather than with the lives of those
fully rational persons who may make some other sort of contribu-
tion. Moreover, there is reason to believe that at least some of these
individuals actually suffer less than others, or have less potential for
happiness (e.g., fetuses, the severely retarded, the dying who are al-
ready suffering). If this is so, and if the general aim is to maxi-
mize the balance of happiness over pain in society, then there are
further grounds for using these sorts of persons as experimental sub-
jects.
It appears that we are now caught between extremes on the
problem of experimentation: Kant's position is so rigid it seems im-
plausibly strong, while the utilitarian solution seems almost heart-
less and inadequate to account for all our moral sensibilities. As a
way out of this impasse, we shall introduce a line of reasoning de-
veloped by John Rawls and spelled out in detail in his book, A The-
ory of Justice.4 2 Rawls works out an alternative conception of mor-
ality, which appeals to the insights of both of his predecessors.
Raws is dissatisfied with the utilitarian approach, for it fails to
account adequately for that element of justice commonly conceived
as fairness. Two examples, one hypothetical and the other histori-
41. Dr. Cowan cites as one example of such a situation the "double blind
trial" in drug studies, wherein it is crucial to keep the subjects ignorant of the
nature of the drug being tested on them. Such ignorance would, of course,
preclude the giving of fully informed consent. Cowan, supra note 2, at 554-
55.
42. J. RAwLS, supra note 10.
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cal, serve to illustrate this failure: If it would help in understand-
ing and eventually curing depression to stimulate a person's brain
with electrodes in order to produce in him a permanent, incapaci-
tating state of depression that could be carefully studied and re-
corded until death, utilitarians would consent to the study. If they
were convinced that the experiments would be useful, utilitarians
would also be likely to allow the cancer study Southam and Levin
performed on the unaware, aged inmates of the Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital, in which cancer cells were injected under their
skin.43 In objecting to these features of the utilitarian moral the-
ory, Rawls observes that "there is no reason in principle why the
greater good of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of
others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a
few might not be made right by greater good shared by many."'44
Rawls believes however that many people would charge such meas-
ures with being unfair, and justifiably so; unlike the utilitarians, he
believes this would be a morally relevant objection.45 He agrees
that our ethical considerations ought to account for the general wel-
fare, but he argues that they must also be concerned with justice, as
well.46 It is not sufficient to worry only about maximizing hap-
piness and minimizing pain.
In order to convey what is involved in determining a just solu-
tion, Rawls uses a thought experiment commonly appealed to in the
literature of social and political philosophy. He asks us to imagine
what a group of persons in a carefully defined original position would
agree to if they were deciding amongst themselves on their social
organization. 47 Such a thought experiment is key to all social con-
tract theories; 48 the important feature of any social contract is that
everyone enter it willingly, that it be the sort of commitment all
could agree to. Rawls uses this technique because he believes that a
just procedure is one that does not take advantage of anyone but
43. See note 29 supra.
44. J. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 26.
45. Id. passim (especially at 3-4).
46. Id. at 4-5.
47. Id. at 11-22.
48. The most prominent examples of such theories are, of course, those
of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The terms of the contracts envisioned by
these theories are not all the same; they arise out of the details of whichever
original position the particular social contract theorist assumes. See T.
HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN; J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT; J. RoUSSEAu, THE So-
CIAL CONTRACT.
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rather, allows everyone equality-a truly fair arrangement. 49 Such
equality does not exist in real life, for actual social contracts are en-
tered into by parties who are most concerned with fostering their
own interests. Those with power are able to influence others and
ensure a contract which, instead of being fair, unjustly supports the
interests of the powerful at the expense of the weak. So the need
arises for a thought experiment, and Rawis asks us to imagine a situ-
ation in which we have to agree on a standard of justice to apply to
all future arrangements, without being able to account for our partic-
ular interests.
To construct this hypothetical situation Rawls directs us to im-
agine ourselves under a "veil of ignorance," 50 whereby we do not
know any specific facts about ourselves: neither our wealth, social
position, talents, preferences, age, nor race. We would know only
the general facts of human nature on which Mill based his notion of
a person's rights: that humans are sentient, that they are concerned
with their own well-being, that they function in a society, and that
their happiness depends upon fulfilling a certain life plan. Rawls
argues that anyone making a decision under this constraint would
have to act fairly, and deliberately avoid exploiting anyone, be-
cause it is possible that the decisionmaker might turn out to be the
one exploited. The decisionmaker under the veil of ignorance
will be most concerned with protecting himself from the worst fate.
As a result, not knowing precisely who he himself is prior to the
lifting of the veil of ignorance, he will have to act so as to protect
everyone from such a fate. Hence, no one will be exploited or taken
advantage of by using such a procedure. Everyone commits himself
in advance to the system that is most fair.
While this is clearly an impractical suggestion since no one can
block out all particular knowledge about himself, it is a valuable ex-
ercise nonetheless. Rawls does not expect us to experience liter-
ally the veil of ignorance. The situation is described in an attempt
to capture our intuitions of what it would be like to act genuinely
fairly, to be in a fully equal position where we would treat all
alike and not favor ourselves. 51 In doing so, we can secure the aim
Kant had in mind in the first formulation of the categorical im-
perative, where he requires us to question whether the maxim of
our action could consistently be adopted as a universal law.52
49. J. RAwLs, supra note 10, at 12.
50. Id. at 12, 136-42.
51. See id. at 18-19.
52. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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Rawls uses the above-described conception to help formulate the
principles of justice that he believes appropriate for evaluating the
major institutions of society. 53 He argues that if persons were con-
strained in such a manner that rendered them all equal, they
would adopt two principles of justice, which can be roughly stated
as follows: (1) Everyone is entitled to the greatest equal liberty
compatible with a like liberty for all; and (2) Inequalities are to be
arranged so that they benefit the least advantaged and that posi-
tions associated with such inequalities are open to all. Further,
these principles are ordered, so that no consideration-not even the
satisfaction of the second principle-can justify depriving someone
of a liberty open -to others.
Rawls' theory provides us with a standard of justice by which to
evaluate social institutions. There are other criteria that a society
must also fulfill in order to be considered good. It should, for ex-
ample, be efficient, productive, and conducive to happiness. But
the criterion of justice is primary and inviolable; it cannot be over-
ridden by utilitarian considerations.
Applying these precepts in the context of experimentation, we
may note first that Rawis' theory, like Kant's, rejects some experi-
ments in principle no matter what benefit might be gained from
them. In particular, Rawls would judge impermissible all experi-
ments that violate a liberty to which a person is entitled. Any ex-
periment that might deprive its subjects of freedom of thought, free-
dom of the person, civil liberties, and political liberty, would be
wrong under his conception. No experiment likely to render its
subjects unable to act as autonomous, independent beings could
be approved. Going even beyond Kant, Rawls would protect purely
social or political liberties-those that are not natural products of
an autonomous will but, rather, arise out of particular social consti-
tutions that define and legitimize such rights.
As an example of experimentation that would call into play
Rawls' concepts, consider some possible uses of electric shock.
Aversion therapy with electric shocks has been used to control
"compulsive gambling, homosexuality, compulsive eating ...
writer's cramp, . . . habitual blushing, . . . and marital infidel-
ity." 54  Presumably, some social scientists are curious to know
whether such itechniques might enable us to destroy motivation to
vote, to form social bonds, or even to speak, in order that they
53. J. RAwLs, supra note 10, at 302-03.
54. J. K rz, supra note 29, at 445.
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may discover how essential and ingrained these needs are in the
human makeup. According to the Rawlsian conception of ethics,
however, it would be wrong to conduct all such experiments.
The second principle of justice would prohibit taking advantage
of the sick for the sake of others' well-being. An unequal distribu-
tion of risks, like other unequal distributions, can be justified only if
it benefits those who are currently disadvantaged. Experiments
that are therapeutic and may benefit their subjects, as well as help
protect the medically well-off, would meet this requirement. How-
ever, experiments that are designed to help persons other than their
subjects, and may in fact harm the subjects, are not permissible if
the subjects are already worse off than the beneficiaries. Hence,
Rawis would not approve of the Southam and Levin cancer study at
the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, nor would he approve of any
study using dying persons for the interests of others where the re-
search did not also benefit its subjects. Similarly, he would disap-
prove of the use of retarded persons as subjects in experiments that
were not directly related to their condition. If the Willowbrook
study done by Saul Krugman were conceived of as an attempt to
infect inmates of an institution with hepatitis virus in order to de-
velop a vaccine useful to others, it too would fail the test. How-
ever, Krugman argues that the participants in this experiment were
certain to contract the disease anyway, and so they were not made
worse off but rather were benefited by the careful attention the
experiment provided. 55 If this assessment is correct, the experiment
seems to satisfy this condition of justice. However, it could be ar-
gued that the fully competent, rational staff members at Willow-
brook were in the same position with respect to contracting hepa-
titis and could just as well have been used as experimental sub-
jects. If there were another option of choosing subjects who
could also be selected without inflicting undue harm, it would have
been preferable to use those who could provide informed consent.
Experiments without informed consent are always to be viewed
as a last resort. In general, however, the second principle of
Rawls' theory of justice appears to preclude the use of institutional-
ized persons in experiments that threaten their well-being, since all
such persons are appropriately viewed as disadvantaged.
According to Rawls then, it is unjust to use dependent persons
as subjects for experiments unrelated to their condition. It is wrong
to take advantage of their limited rationality and diminished ca-
55. Krugman & Giles, supra note 32, at 1018-29.
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pacities in order to serve the ends of others. However, there is still
the problem of experimental research that investigates the very con-
ditions with which such persons are afflicted. For example, since
the effects of drugs may differ considerably in infants and in adults,
how could the effects of new drugs on infants ever be established, if
experiments on infants are prohibited? 56
Rawis' principles do not give us clear guidance on this issue, but
by following his line of reasoning as a model we can gain a more
specific understanding of our responsibilities toward dependent per-
sons, as well as some direction concerning how they ought to be
treated with regard to experimentation. Rawls claims that the just
solution is always one to which everyone could agree in advance. "
Some medical conditions even provide a realistic framework for
using the assumption of the relevant veil of ignorance, since we
do not know in advance which of us will be victims of many dis-
eases. Thus it is reasonable to assume that a fair procedure for se-
lecting subjects for medical and psychological research in such cases
is one upon which we can now agree without knowing our personal
connection to the disease. It is, for instance, in the interest of all
potential sufferers of heart disease to agree to undergo some dis-
comfort for the sake of a study that might help eradicate the dis-
ease. Even without assuming any altruistic motives in people, it is
reasonable to expect them to be willing to agree to such a procedure
simply because they wish to protect themselves from developing un-
treatable heart disease. By the same -token, people might also be
expected to agree to participate in certain studies aimed at reducing
the ill effects of the disease in those who are victimized by it.
Since it is rational for all concerned to agree ito experiments without
undue risk, we can conclude that persons should all be willing to
provide informed consent when called upon to participate. Relying
on the sense of justice of those whose participation is needed, how-
ever, it is appropriate to insist upon informed consent in such cases,
56. Stated simply:
[O]ne cannot use new drugs in children unless they have been cer-
tified for use in children. But one cannot get new drugs certified for
use in children because it is nonbeneficial research and one cannot
do nonbeneficial research in children. Hence, either the pediatricians
practice illegally or the children become therapeutic orphans.
Cowan, supra note 2 at 557.
57. This view is implicit in A Theory of Justice and is stated explicitly
in Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 Tim PmE.osoPImcAL RaV. 164, 171 (1958):
'The idea is that everyone should be required to make in advance a firm com-
mitment, which others also may reasonably be expected to make ......
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and to reserve the right of refusal in keeping with the spirit of
Rawls' first principle-the greatest liberty principle.
In experimenting on persons with Down's syndrome we cannot
employ directly analogous reasoning because the veil of ignorance
is no longer real (though many can assume it in contemplating bear-
ing such a child). Still, using Rawls' model we can try to deter-
mine what we would agree to if we took seriously the possibility
that we might be affected by the condition. What research on both
healthy and afflicted children would we agree to, in the interest of
curing or treating Down's syndrome, if we seriously expected to be
subjects of such research ourselves? What risks or suffering would
we agree to in the interest of minimizing the severity and incidence
of this condition? We need not actually experience the condition
in order to address this question, any more than we have to be the
worst off member of society to recognize the rightness of Rawls'
principles of justice. We must simply try, so far as we are able, to
determine what it would be like to have Down's syndrome.
Such an approach is significantly different from Kant's proposed
method of accounting for everyone. Kant recommended that we
treat every human being the same, qua member of the human spe-
cies.58 All persons were assumed to be entitled to the same treat-
ment by virtue of belonging to a rational species. In contrast,
Rawls' procedure licenses treating people differently according to
their special interests. Kant takes the Golden Rule literally, advis-
ing us to do to others as we would want them to do to us. Rawls
modifies it by recommending that we do to others as we would want
them to do to us if we were they.59 While we might not want ,to
have brain surgery done on us now, we might be willing and eager to
have it done if we were suffering violent headaches that might be al-
leviated by surgery; we might even decide now that we want it
done in the event we were ever to suffer such headaches, even if at
that later point we were too irrational to agree to it. Similarly, al-
though we would not want to be institutionalized during a present
state of full mental capacity, if we were so severely retarded that
we could not care for our own needs, we might well want to be insti-
tutionalized if we were capable of choosing.
In following Rawls' method, we must imagine what we would
choose in various circumstances, knowing full well that if such con-
ditions obtained, we would be incapable of rational choice. This
58. See discussion of Kant in text following notes 11 and 21 supra.
59. J. RAwrs, supra note 10, passim (especially at 95-108).
1975]
466 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:434
reasoning justifies paternalism in cases involving persons who are
not fully rational, for rational agents would want to insure them-
selves against any situation in which they might lack the power to
pursue their own interest. In the original position, "the parties adopt
principles stipulating when others are authorized to act in their be-
half and to override their present wishes if necessary; and this
they do recognizing that sometimes their capacity to act rationally
for their good may fail, or be lacking altogether." 60
Hence, while justice requires us to extend liberty as far as possi-
ble, it also provides for a cautious use of paternalism when an in-
dividual is not rational enough to care for his own interests. Such
paternalism is justified by the fact that it is rational to choose to
have someone behave paternalistically towards us should we become
incapable of looking out for ourselves. Thus, all persons are likely
to agree to such a practice, provided it includes carefully designed
constraints prohibiting paternalism when persons are rational
enough to decide for themselves.
If someone were called upon to make ,a paternalistic decision on
our behalf, that person would be required "to do what we would do
for ourselves if we were rational .... 61 For ourselves, when con-
templating a paternalistic action, "[a]s we know less and less
about a person, we act for him as we would act for ourselves
from the standpoint of the original position. '62
If the preceding account provides an acceptable model for mor-
ally justified paternalism, it follows that when a decision needs to be
made on behalf of a dependent person whether or not he should
participate in an experiment, the task is to determine whether it
would be rational for anyone to agree from the position of the rele-
vant veil of ignorance. Experiments with high risk or poor risk-
benefit ratios would not pass this -test, since it can be assumed that
no rational agent in the original position would agree to be a partici-
pant. In other words, experiments must at least meet rigid utili-
tarian standards to be approved by this method; but they must not
bear too high a cost for any particular individual.
According to 'Rawls' theory, the researcher is always in a better
moral position when he has obtained genuinely informed consent;
having gained consent, the experimenter is most assured of acting in
accordance with what the experimental subject himself could
60. Id. at 249.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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agree to. Further, the second principle of justice urges that hard-
ships be distributed in a manner that serves the interests of the dis-
advantaged. Since it is reasonable to hold that persons who are not
fully rational are disadvantaged by virtue of their diminished capaci-
ties, it seems clear that they should not be made to suffer any
further for the sake of people who are more advantaged.
,If, therefore, the use of human beings as experimental subjects
can be justified at all, it is best to choose those who have provided
informed consent rather than those who have not. An example of a
wholly unjustifiable experiment is one performed in 1949 to investi-
gate the possibility of toxic effects from agene, a substance used in
the manufacture of flour.63 There had previously been many re-
ports of its toxic effects on animals and there was a desire to know
if it was also toxic for humans. Thus, eighty boys, whose ages
ranged from 10 to 15 years, were chosen from a residential school,
and all were fed agenized flour for 6 months. When no ill effects
developed, two adults were put on agenized flour for 6 weeks.
Surely, if the experiment had to be conducted at all, it could have
begun with adult volunteers-perhaps, the experimenters them-
selves.
If there is no alternative but to use subjects who cannot pro-
vide informed consent, and if the experiment is warranted in terms
of its risk-benefit ratio, then a third party has a right to consent on
behalf of the subject only if (1) the decisionmaker has good reason
to believe it is a decision the person would in fact make if he were
rational, or (2) lacking such information, it is in accordance with
a decision any rational person would make knowing he might be in
the subject's place. On this model, the paternalistic decisioumaker
must ask: "Would it be rational for me to agree if I were he?"
In concluding this section, we turn to a distinctive range of
moral problems arising in connection with a special class of per-
sons whose use in experimentation has occasioned much debate.
We refer, of course, to prisoners, whose circumstances give rise to a
unique sort of dilemma. Prison conditions are such that the free-
dom of prisoners is severely restricted in ways that render them sus-
ceptible to various forms of coercion. Moreover, some members
of our society clearly seem fto value the lives of prisoners less than
the lives of others; in Kantian terminology, prisoners are sometimes
perceived as possessing less dignity and, as a result, are viewed as
63. See Elithorn, Johnson & Crosskey, Effects of Agenised Flour on Man,
Tim LANCFT, Jan. 22, 1949, at 143.
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less deserving of respect. Such an attitude requires justification be-
fore it can be incorporated into any moral arguments, and it surely
cannot be justified within the scope of Kant's theory. It is, neverthe-
less, an attitude that some people have and are prepared to act on.
Because of these circumstances it is important to guarantee the pro-
hibition of any coercive use of prisoners in experiments.
However, there is a further problem with using prisoners as ex-
experimental subjects-a problem that is related to the unusual cir-
cumstances inherent in a prisoner's situation. It is sometimes ar-
gued that the prison environment actually distorts the needs and de-
sires of its inmates to a point where prisoners are no longer fully
capable of accurately identifying their own interests. 64 For instance,
in prison a dollar assumes a value very much out of proportion to its
normal worth, for the ability to purchase cigarettes or chocolates
becomes a matter of paramount importance to those allowed little
opportunity to make choices. 65 Even this small sum may appear to
be of such importance that the prisoner will sacrifice what others
perceive -to be his genuine well-being in pursuit of it. Under these
circumstances, it is quite easy for someone who does not so value that
dollar to get prisoners to take risks to which a rational agent in
a natural social setting would never agree. Experimenters are in a
position to take advantage of this unfortunate situation and any re-
sultant nonrational preferences of prisoners.
If the judgment is correct that prisoners are responding inap-
propriately to options presented-that they are neglecting their
overall well-being for the sake of lesser ends-then there is reason
to believe that we cannot consider their consent to participate in ex-
periments as legitimate, even if they have been fully informed
about the details of the experiment. It would seem that prisoners
themselves may mistakenly identify their own ends; they may act
in ways that bring about a reduction in their own well-being. Now,
it is true -that we all do this to some extent, but the point is that an
identifiable pattern seems to exist according to which many persons
appear to lose perspective on their interests in similar ways under
prison conditions.6 6 Such uniformity allows us to specify the partic-
ular areas in which their surroundings decrease the ability of prison-
ers to make rational decisions.
Nevertheless, it may be the case that inmates' interests are genu-
64. See Mitford, supra note 31, at 64-73.
65. Id.
66. Cf. M. PAPPWORTH, HuMAN GuINEA Pios 63-68 (1967).
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inely changed in the prison environment and, as a result, such pris-
oners are not misperceiving their ends or acting irrationally. A
proper evaluation of this issue will require a complex, well-con-
firmed theory of human ends of a sort not currently provided by
psychology or the social sciences generally. But if we suspect that
prisoners' preferences have become inappropriately distorted, and,
further, if in applying Rawls' test we decide that we would not want
to be in circumstances leading us to reorder our current values if
we were to find ourselves in prison, then we are obliged to protect
prisoners from making agreements we fear might be irrational. For
example, the current practice of using prisoners in the first phase of
drug-testing on humans 67 seems to reflect an assumption that no
free, rational person would agree to be among the first human be-
ings subjected to the drug. If this assumption is true, Rawls' model
yields the conclusion that this use of prisoners is unwarranted.
Kant insists that we respect a person's ends if ever we use him
as a means. If prison renders some persons incapable of accurately
perceiving their ends, an experimenter who responds to their mis-
takenly identified ends would fail to satisfy Kant's imperative. Ex-
perimenters who obtain subjects by meeting prisoners' mistakenly
chosen ends-who actively take advantage of this confusion-are
treating these persons as means and not as ends. However, there
are some experiments that do address the prisoner-subjects' legitimate
ends, be they a sense of altruism, a chance of parole, or even mini-
mal monetary reward. Such experiments could then be justified,
provided they also meet the requirements for informed consent as
discussed above: the prisoner-subject's decision to participate
must be a rational choice for him to make under the circumstances,
and, further, the options open to him should be such that his consent
can be considered wholly voluntary in the relevant respect; that is,
it must be uncoerced.
V. CONCLUSION
In providing a theoretical framework for analyzing the moral
dilemmas that arise in human experimentation,68 we have exam-
67. See id. at 62, 65, 67; EXPERIMENTATION wiTH HuMAN BEINGS, supra
note 29, at 1041-49.
68. There are some areas of concern that have been barely mentioned in
this article. One large area is significant in much social scientific research:
the use of deception. This technique causes special problems because it ap-
pears necessary to deceive the subjects in some experiments (especially in psy-
chology) in order to investigate the topic under inquiry. But subjects who are
deceived are not, by definition, informed, and so informed consent can never
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ined the issues involved in experimenting on human subjects from
a number of philosophical perspectives. We began by looking at
the fundamental questions concerning human experimentation as an
acceptable moral practice: Why is there an ethical issue at all sur-
rounding the use of humans in research? What characteristics do
human beings have that set up presumptions against using people in
experiments as we use inanimate objects or lower forms of life?69
We found that the characteristics of sentience and rationality in the
human species are the properties that give rise to the need for ethi-
cal principles of a general sort, from which particular moral judg-
ments flow, assessing the rightness or wrongness of any action.
The two major ethical traditions in modem Western philosophy,
represented in turn by John Stuart Mill and .Immanuel Kant, both
have at their base a moral principle that emphasizes the intrinsic
value or inherent worth of one or both of these fundamental at-
tributes of humans. Sentience, conjoined with the related capacity
for purposive or goal-directed behavior, and rationality, along
with its derivative concepts of autonomy and the inherent dignity of
humans, together comprise a framework for ethical judgments or
moral decisionmaking in virtually any human context. As we saw,
be obtained in principle. When confronted with objections to deception in psy-
chological experiments, some researchers known to these writers dismiss them
as arising out of too rigid an adherence to ethical rules that prescribe truth-
telling. If, however, we are justified in attaching significant moral value to
the practice of obtaining fully informed, voluntary consent, then the simple re-
ply based on truth-telling will not satisfy the serious objector to deception in
social scientific research. Here, it would seem, the risk-benefit ratio assumes
some importance since the experimenter is obliged to seek ways of conducting
research without deception, so that the informed consent of his subjects can
be obtained. Moreover, if he can find no experimental design compatible with
obtaining genuinely informed consent, then the potential benefits of the ex-
periment (or the research in general) must be objectively assessed in light of
the fact that human beings are being used without their informed consent by
a researcher as a means to his scientific ends.
There are other special problems of an ethical nature in social scientific
research (e.g., maintaining confidentiality), and in still other areas of medicine
there exist a variety of related issues, such as the use of untreated control
groups in experimentation with new drugs or therapeutic procedures, and the
widespread use of placebos in experimental therapeutic contexts. The sort of
analysis offered in this paper can easily be extended to cover these related is-
sues, and once equipped with one or more basic moral principles, which lie
at the heart of a well-founded ethical theory, we can approach almost all spe-
cial cases and new situations in which moral dilemmas occur.
69. The use of higher animals is, of course, the subject of much debate
because such creatures more closely resemble humans in particular, relevant re-
spects.
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the contemporary theory of justice propounded by John Rawls
draws on elements from these and other philosophical traditions
(e.g., the social contract theories) and proposes a pair of principles
for evaluating institutions and social arrangements where justice is a
concern. While it seems to us that Rawls' theory is superior in a
a number of ways to those of Mill and Kant in its application to
ethical issues in human experimentation, ultimately the choice of a
basic moral principle is left to each individual. Rawls' account
might provide a means of settling ethical disputes between, say, a
utilitarian and a Kantian over what kind of research on human sub-
jects is morally justifiable. As we have seen, actions that are
morally permissible according to the utilitarian theory may be imper-
missible according to Kant. Rawls' conjectural method enables us
to bypass dilemmas of this sort in seeking a just, fair solution to
moral problems. His account is not problem-free, but it does seem
significantly applicable to ethical issues in human experimentation.
Of course, the application of ethical theories to everyday, prac-
tical matters is not an easy task. In addition, conflicts of legitimate
interest among persons and conflicts of fundamental principles will
always arise, in the nature of human contingencies. The consistent,
conscientious practice of morally justifiable behavior is difficult, as
most people know by experience and observation. It is our hope
that the philosophical perspectives presented in this paper will, at
least, clarify and illuminate our thinking on a range of moral con-
cerns we all share about experimentation on human subjects.
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